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REVEALED ALTRUISM1 
BY JAMES C. COX, DANIEL FRIEDMAN, AND VJOLLCA SADIRAJ 
This paper develops a nonparametric theory of preferences over one's own and oth- 
ers' monetary payoffs. We introduce "more altruistic than" (MAT), a partial ordering 
over such preferences, and interpret it with known parametric models. We also intro- 
duce and illustrate "more generous than" (MGT), a partial ordering over opportunity 
sets. Several recent studies focus on two-player extensive form games of complete in- 
formation in which the first mover (FM) chooses a more or less generous opportunity 
set for the second mover (SM). Here reciprocity can be formalized as the assertion that 
an MGT choice by the FM will elicit MAT preferences in the SM. A further assertion 
is that the effect on preferences is stronger for acts of commission by FM than for acts 
of omission. We state and prove propositions on the observable consequences of these 
assertions. Finally, empirical support for the propositions is found in existing data from 
investment and dictator games, the carrot and stick game, and the Stackelberg duopoly 
game and in new data from Stackelberg mini-games. 
KEYWORDS: Neoclassical preferences, social preferences, convexity, reciprocity, ex- 
periments. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
WHAT ARE THE CONTENTS OF PREFERENCES? People surely care about their 
own material well-being, for example, as proxied by income. In some contexts 
people also may care about others' well-being. Abstract theory and common 
sense have long recognized that possibility, but until recently it has been ne- 
glected in applied work. Evidence from the laboratory and the field (as sur- 
veyed in Fehr and Gachter (2000), for example) has begun to persuade econo- 
mists to develop specific models of how and when a person's preferences 
depend on others' material payoffs (Sobel (2005)). 
Andreoni and Miller (2002) report "dictator" experiments in which a hu- 
man subject decides on an allocation for himself and for some anonymous 
other subject while facing a linear budget constraint. Their analysis confirms 
consistency with the generalized axiom of revealed preference (GARP) for a 
large majority of subjects. They conclude that altruism can be modeled using 
neoclassical preference theory (Hicks (1939), Samuelson (1947)). 
In this paper, we take three further steps down the same path. First, we an- 
alyze nonlinear opportunity sets. Such sets allow a player to reveal more about 
the tradeoff between her own and another's income, for example, whether her 
'For helpful comments, we thank James Andreoni, Geert Dhaene, Steven Gjerstad, Stephen 
Leider, Joel Sobel, Stefan Traub, and Frans van Winden as well as participants in the Interna- 
tional Meeting of the Economic Science Association (ESA) 2004, the North American Regional 
ESA Meeting 2004, and at Economics Department seminars at UCSC, Harvard, and University 
College London. The final revision is much improved due to the suggestions of three anonymous 
referees and an associate editor. Financial support was provided by the National Science Foun- 
dation (Grant numbers IIS-0630805 and IIS-0527770). 
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indifference curves have positive or negative slope and whether they are lin- 
ear or strictly convex. Second, we give another player an initial move that can 
be more or less generous. This allows us to distinguish conditional altruism- 
positive and negative reciprocity-from unconditional altruism. It also allows 
us to clarify the observable consequences of convex preferences and of recip- 
rocal preferences. Third, we distinguish active from passive initial moves; that 
is, we distinguish among acts of omission, acts of commission, and absence of 
opportunity to act, and examine their impacts on reciprocity. 
Our goal is to develop an approach to reciprocity firmly grounded in neoclas- 
sical preference and demand theory.2 By contrast, much of the existing litera- 
ture on social preferences either ignores reciprocity motives or grounds them 
in psychological game theory. Our focus is on how players' choices respond to 
observable events and opportunities, rather than to their beliefs about other 
players' intentions or types. 
Section 2 begins by developing representations of preferences over own and 
others' income, and formalizes the idea that one preference ordering is "more 
altruistic than" (MAT) another. It allows for the possibility of negative regard 
for the other's income; in this case MAT really means "less malevolent than." 
Special cases include the main parametric models of other-regarding prefer- 
ences that have appeared in the literature. 
Section 3 introduces opportunities and formalizes the idea that one oppor- 
tunity set can be more generous than (MGT) another. It explains that MGT 
is a partial ordering over standard budget sets and is a complete ordering 
over opportunity sets in several two-player games, including the well-known in- 
vestment, dictator, and Stackelberg duopoly games. Section A.5 demonstrates 
MGT orderings of opportunity sets for several other games in the literature on 
social preferences. 
Section 4 formalizes reciprocity. Axiom R asserts that more generous 
choices by a first mover induce more altruistic preferences in a second mover. 
An interpretation (advocated in Cox, Friedman, and Gjerstad (2007)) is that 
preferences are emotional state-dependent and that the first mover's generos- 
ity induces a more benevolent (or less malevolent) emotional state in the sec- 
ond mover. Axiom S asserts that the reciprocity effect is stronger following an 
act of commission (upsetting the status quo) than following an act of omission 
(upholding the status quo), and that the effect is weaker when the first mover 
is unable to alter the status quo. 
Section 5 presents three general theoretical propositions on the conse- 
quences of convex preferences. Among other things, these propositions extend 
2Cox, Friedman, and Gjerstad (2007) took a similar perspective, but it imposed a tight para- 
metric structure (constant elasticity of substitution (CES)) on preferences and reported structural 
estimates from various existing data sets. Here we seek general results attributable to general 
properties such as convexity and reciprocity, and we test the results directly on new as well as 
existing data. 
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standard results on revealed preference theory and show how easy it is in em- 
pirical work to conflate the separate effects of convexity and reciprocity. 
Sections 6-9 bring revealed altruism theory to four data sets. Proposition 4 
derives testable predictions for investment and dictator games. Together, these 
two games provide diagnostic data for both Axioms R and S. Propositions 5 
and 6 derive testable predictions for carrot and stick games and for Stack- 
elberg duopoly games. The duopoly games are especially useful because the 
Follower's opportunity sets are MGT-ordered and have a parabolic shape that 
enables the Follower to reveal a wide range of positive and negative trade-offs 
between his own income and the Leader's income. Proposition 7 obtains pre- 
dictions for a new variant game, called the Stackelberg mini-game, in which the 
Leader has only two alternative output choices, one of which is clearly more 
generous than the other. This game provides diagnostic data for discriminating 
between the effects of convexity and reciprocity. 
Within the limitations of the data, the test results are consistent with pre- 
dictions. Following a concluding discussion, Appendix A collects all formal 
proofs and other mathematical details. Instructions to subjects in the Stack- 
elberg mini-game appear in Appendix B. 
2. PREFERENCES 
Let Y = (Y1, Y2, ..., YN) E 91N represent the payoff vector in a game that 
pays each of N > 2 players a nonnegative income. Admissible preferences for 
each player i are smooth and convex orderings on the positive orthant rT 
N that 
are strictly increasing in own income Yi. The set of all admissible preferences is 
denoted T3. Any particular preference P E q3 can be represented by a smooth 
utility function u:•N N_ I Nwith positive ith partial derivative du/dYi = Iuy > 0. 
The other first partial derivatives are zero for standard selfish preferences, but 
we allow for the possibility that they are positive in some regions (where the 
agent is "benevolent") and negative in others (where she is "malevolent"). 
We shall focus on two-player extensive form games of complete information, 
and to streamline notation we shall denote own ("my") income by Yi = m and 
the other player's ("your") income by Y-i = y. Thus preferences are defined on the positive quadrant N2 - {(m, y) m, y > 0}. The marginal rate of sub- 
stitution MRS(m, y) = um/lu is not well defined at points where the agent is 
selfish; it diverges to +oo and back from -oo when we pass from slight benev- 
olence to slight malevolence. Therefore, it is convenient to work with willing- 
ness to pay, WTP = 1/MRS, the amount of own income the agent is willing to 
give up in order to increase the other agent's income by a unit; it moves from 
slightly positive through zero to slightly negative when the agent goes from 
slight benevolence to slight malevolence. Note that WTP = uly/um is intrinsic, 
independent of the particular utility function u chosen to represent the given 
preferences. 
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What sort of factors might affect w = WTP? Of course, for admissible pref- 
erences the sign of w is the same as the sign of the partial derivative u,. Con- 
vexity tells us more: w increases as one moves southward along an indifference 
curve. That is, my benevolence increases (or malevolence decreases) as your 
income decreases along an indifference curve. This principle is quite intuitive, 
and sometimes it is useful to strengthen it as follows. We say that admissible 
preferences have the increasing benevolence (IB) property if wm O0. Occasion- 
ally we refer to the related property w < O0. Section A.1 shows how convexity, 
increasing benevolence, and homotheticity are related to each other and to the 
slope and curvature of indifference curves. 
We are now prepared to formalize the idea that one preference ordering 
on 9•2 is more altruistic than another. Two different preference orderings 
A, B G c3 over income allocation vectors might represent the preferences of 
two different players or might represent the preferences of the same player in 
two different situations. 
DEFINITION 1: For a given domain D c 921 we say that A MAT B on D if 
WTPA(m, y) > WTPB(m, y) for all (m, y) E D. 
The idea is straightforward. Like the single crossing property in a different 
context, MAT induces a partial ordering on preferences over own and others' 
income. In the benevolence case, A MAT B means that A has shallower in- 
difference curves than B in (m, y) space, so A indicates a willingness to pay 
more m for a unit increase in y than does B. In the malevolence case, WTP is 
less negative for A, so it indicates a lesser willingness to pay for a unit decrease 
in y. 
Section A.2 verifies that MAT is a partial ordering on q3. When no particular 
domain D is indicated, the MAT ordering is understood to refer to the entire 
positive orthant D = 12. 
Four examples illustrate how MAT is incorporated into existing parametric 
models. 
EXAMPLE 2.1--Linear Inequality-Averse Preferences (for N = 2; Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999)): Let preferences J = A, B be represented by uj(m, y) = 
(1 + Oj)m - Ojy, where 
{/I j, 
if 
m 
< 
y, 
Oj- 
-s, ifnm_ 
y, 
with p3 < a8 and 0 < p < 1. Straightforwardly, A MAT B if and only if 
0O < 0B. 
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EXAMPLE 2.2-Nonlinear Inequality-Averse Preferences (for N = 2; Bolton 
and Ockenfels (2000)): Let preferences J = A, B be represented by 
uj(m, y) = vj(m, o-), where 
m/(m + y), ifm+y > 0, 
r- 1/2, if m + y = 0. 
It can be easily verified that A MAT B if and only if VA1/VA2 < V1/v82. 
EXAMPLE 2.3-Quasi-Maximin Preferences (for N = 2; Charness and Rabin 
(2002)): Let preferences J = A, B be represented by 
m + yj(1 - 8j)y, if m < y, 
u my (1 - 8,y)m + 
y•y, 
if m > y, 
and y E [0, 1], 8 E (0, 1). It is straightforward (although a bit tedious) to 
verify that A MAT B if and only if 
YA > Y_)L max) 1- 8 1 
EXAMPLE 2.4-Egocentric Altruism (CES) Preferences (for N = 2; Cox and 
Sadiraj (2007)): Let preferences J= A, B be represented by 
u j(ma Y 
Ja), 
if a (-oo, 1)\{0), 
u,(m, y)= a 
my Oj, if a = 0. 
If 0 < OB 
_< 
O, then A MAT B. Verification is straightforward: WTPJ = 
O,(m/y)1-a, and 5 = A, B imply WTP /WTPe = 8A/80 > 1. "Egocentric- 
ity" means that uj(x + s, x - e) > U 
r(X 
- E, x + e) for any E (0, x), which 
implies WTP(m, m) < 1. 
Much of the theoretical literature on social preferences relies on special as- 
sumptions that may appear to be departures from neoclassical preference the- 
ory (Hicks (1939), Samuelson (1947)). The preceding examples help clarify 
the issues. All four are examples of convex preferences and (except for the 
nonlinear inequality aversion model) they are also homothetic. The inequality 
aversion models incorporate a very specific inconsistency with the neoclassical 
assumption of positive monotonicity: my marginal utility for your income re- 
verses sign on the 45 degree line. A preference for efficiency (i.e., for a larger 
income sum) is consistent with a limiting case of the quasi-maximin model or 
with admissible preferences with WTP = 1. We shall now see that for more 
general preferences, the efficiency of choices depends on the shape of the op- 
portunity set. 
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3. OPPORTUNITIES 
Define an opportunity set F (or synonymously, a feasible set or budget set) 
as a convex compact subset of 92. It is convenient and harmless (given pref- 
erences monotone in own income m) to assume free disposal for own income, 
that is, if (m, y) E F, then (am, y) e F for all a E [0, 1]. Thus an opportunity 
set F is the convex hull of two lines: (a) its projection YF = {y > O : 3m > 0 s.t. 
(m, y) e F} on the y axis and (b) its eastern boundary dEF = {(m, y) E F:Vx > 
m, (x, y) 4 F). 
Since F is convex, each boundary point has a supporting hyperplane (i.e., 
tangent line) defined by an inward-pointing normal vector, and F is contained 
in its closed positive half-space; see, for example, Rockafellar (1970, p. 100). 
At some boundary points (informally called corners or kinks) the supporting 
hyperplane is not unique; examples will be noted later. At the other (regu- 
lar) boundary points there is a smooth function f whose zero isoquant de- 
fines the boundary locally. We often need to work near vertical tangents, so 
rather than the usual marginal rate of transformation (MRT), we use the 
need to pay, NTP(m, y) = 1/MRT(m, y) = f,/fm, evaluated at a regular point 
(m, y) e 8EF. Again NTP is intrinsic, independent of the choice f used to rep- 
resent the boundary segment. 
We seek an objective definition of one opportunity set G being more gen- 
erous to me than another opportunity set F. There is an obvious necessary 
condition: that G allows me to achieve higher income than does F. Since my 
preferences are monotone in own income, I clearly benefit when you allow me 
to increase it. For some purposes, it is helpful to impose a second condition: 
that you do not increase your own potential income far more than mine. If you 
do, I might regard your move as self-serving and not especially generous. 
These intuitions are captured in conditions (a) and (b) in Definition 2 below, 
using the following notation. Let y; = sup YF denote your maximum feasible 
income and let m* = sup{m: 3y > 0 s.t. (m, y) e Fl denote my maximum fea- 
sible income in an opportunity set F. 
DEFINITION 2: Opportunity set G C 912 is more generous than opportunity 
set F c 92 if (a) m - m* > 0 and (b) m* - m* > y? - y;. In this case we write 
G MGT F. 
MGT is a partial ordering over opportunity sets, as noted in Section A.3. 
Condition (a) seems compelling because it springs directly from the most basic 
intuitions about generosity, but one can imagine plausible variants on condi- 
tion (b). To understand its role, consider an alternative definition of MGT, call 
it MGT Light, that includes only condition (a). It turns out that MGT Light 
has the same implications as MGT for 10 of the 12 prominent examples of op- 
portunity sets from the social preferences literature discussed in this section, in 
Section 9, and in Section A.5. We begin with a very prominent example where 
condition (b) does matter. 
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I/PG 
Y 
IF /PF 
0 IF G 
m 
FIGURE 1.-Standard budget set. 
EXAMPLE 3.1--Standard Budget Set: Let F = {(m, y) e N:"m + py < Il for given p, I > 0. Then the eastern boundary dEF is the budget line {(m, y) E 
N:21m + py = I}, as shown by the solid line in Figure 1. The NTP is p along 
dEF. Clearly m* = I and yF = I/p. To illustrate the MGT ordering, let F be 
determined by IF and pF and let G be determined by IG and pG. Part (a) of 
the definition is simply IG IF, but part (b) requires IG - IF > IG/PG - IF/IPF For example, if IG = 1*.1F while pG = PF/100 so y= = 110y, as shown by the 
dashed line in Figure 1, then you have not clearly revealed generosity toward 
me by choosing G over F, since you are serving your own material interests far 
more than mine. Your choice would more clearly reveal generosity if G (and F) 
were also consistent with part (b). 
EXAMPLE 3.2-Investment Game (Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995)): 
In this two-player sequential move game, the first mover (FM) and the second 
mover (SM) each have an initial endowment of I > 1. The FM sends an amount 
s E [0, I] to SM, who receives ks. Then the SM returns an amount r E [0, ks] 
to the FM, resulting in payoffs m = I + ks - r for the SM and y = I - s + r for 
the FM. The FM's choice of s selects the SM's opportunity set F, with Eastern 
boundary {(m, y) e 92 :m + y = 21 + (k - 1)s, m e [I, I + ks]} with NTP = 1. 
Figure 2 shows Fs for s = 3 and 9 when I = 10 and k = 3. In the figure, one 
sees that (a) 
m)9 
= 37 > 19 = 
mF3 
and (b) y;9 -Y;3 = 28 - 16 = 12 < 18= 
37 - 19 = 
m9 - m, 
so F9 MGT F3. More generally, it is straightforward to 
check that s > s' e [0, I] implies for k > 2 that F, MGT Fs,, that is, sending a 
larger amount is indeed more generous. 
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FIGURE 2.-Investment game: second mover's opportunity set. 
EXAMPLE 3.3-Carrot and/or Stick Games (Andreoni, Harbaugh, and 
Vesterlund (2003)): In each of the games, the FM has an initial endowment 
of 240 and the SM has an initial endowment of 0. The FM sends an amount 
s e [40, 240] to the SM, who receives s. The SM then returns an amount r 
which is multiplied by 5 for the FM, resulting in payoffs m = s - Irl for the SM 
and y = 240 - s + 5r for the FM. 
The games differ only on the sign restrictions placed on r. In the stick 
game, the SM can punish the FM at a personal cost by "returning" nonpos- 
itive amounts r that do not make either person's payoff negative. The FM's 
choice s induces an MGT ordering on the SM opportunity sets Fs. Part (a) 
of the definition is satisfied because m* = s and part (b) is satisfied because 
ys = 240 - s. For F = Fs and G = F,, with s < s', we have y - y = -(s'- s) < 
0 <s'- s= m -- m. 
In the carrot game, the SM's choice must be nonnegative, r E [0, s]. Here the 
FM's choice s does not induce an MGT ordering on the SM opportunity sets 
F,. Of course, m*, 
= s still ensures that part (a) of MGT is satisfied and thus 
the opportunity sets are MGT Light ordered. However, 
yj; 
= 240 - s + 5s = 
240 + 4s. For F = Fs and G = F,, with s < s', we have y - 
y,* 
= 4(s'- s) > 
s' - s= m* - 
m-, 
contradicting part (b) of the MGT definition. 
The carrot-stick game drops the sign restrictions on the SM's choice: here 
the positive or negative amounts returned r cannot make either person's payoff 
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negative. As in the carrot game, the SM opportunity sets are not MGT-ordered 
because part (b) is not satisfied (though they are ordered by MGT Light). 
EXAMPLE 3.4-Stackelberg Duopoly Game (e.g., Varian (1992, pp. 295- 
298)): Consider a duopoly with zero fixed cost, constant and equal marginal 
cost, and nontrivial linear demand. Without further loss of generality one can 
normalize so that the profit margin (price minus marginal cost) is M = T - 
qL - qF, where qL E [0, T] is the Leader's output choice and qF E [0, T - qL] is 
the Follower's output to be chosen. Thus payoffs are m = MqF and y = MqL. 
The Follower's opportunity set F(qL) has as its eastern boundary a parabolic 
arc opening toward the y axis, as shown in Figure 3 for T = 24 and qL = 6, 8, 
and 11. Unlike the earlier examples, the NTP varies smoothly from negative 
to positive values as one moves northward along the boundary. These oppor- 
tunity sets are MGT ordered by the Leader's output choice; see Section A.4 of 
the Appendix for a verification and for explicit formulas for NTP. 
These four examples are far from exhaustive. Section A.5 of the Appen- 
dix demonstrates natural MGT orderings of opportunity sets in many games 
prominent in the social preferences literature, including the ultimatum game 
(Giith, Schmittberger, and Schwarze (1982)), the ultimatum mini-game (Gale, 
Binmore, and Samuelson (1995); see also Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher (2003)), 
140 
120 
100 
a. 80 
60 
q,=l1 qL=8 qL=6 
40 
20 
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 
Follower Payoff 
FIGURE 3.-Stackelberg duopoly game: Follower's opportunity set. 
This content downloaded from 131.96.28.172 on Fri, 15 Jan 2016 16:33:30 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
40 J. C. COX, D. FRIEDMAN, AND V. SADIRAJ 
the sequential public goods game with two players (Varian (1994)), the gift 
exchange labor market (Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl (1993)), the moonlight- 
ing game (Abbink, Irlenbusch, and Renner (2000)), the power to take game 
(Bosman and van Winden (2002)), and the ring test (Liebrand (1984); see also 
Sonnemans, van Dijk, and van Winden (2006)). 
4. RECIPROCITY 
Reciprocity is key to our analysis. We examine it from the perspective of 
neoclassical preference theory, stressing observables. Thus positive reciprocity 
reveals itself via preferences for altruistic actions that benefit someone else, 
at one's own material cost, because that person's behavior was generous. Sim- 
ilarly, negative reciprocity reveals itself via preferences for actions that harm 
someone else, at one's own material cost, because that person's behavior was 
harmful to oneself. Our reciprocity axiom states that more generous choices by 
one player induce more altruistic preferences in a second player; by the same 
token, less generous choices by one induce less altruistic preferences in the 
other. 
To formalize, consider a two-person extensive form game of complete in- 
formation in which the first mover chooses an opportunity set C E C and the 
second mover chooses the payoff vector (m, y) e C. Initially, the second mover 
knows the collection C of possible opportunity sets. Prior to her choice of pay- 
offs, she learns the actual opportunity set C e C, and acquires preferences Ac. 
Reciprocity is captured in the following axiom. 
AXIOM R: Let the first mover choose the actual opportunity set for the second 
mover from the collection C. If F, G E C and G MGT F, then AG MAT AF. 
There is a traditional distinction between sins of commission (active imposi- 
tion of harm) and sins of omission (failure to prevent harm). By analogy, one 
can draw a distinction between the "virtues" of commission and omission. An- 
other person's benevolent or malevolent intentions are more clearly revealed 
by an action that overturns the status quo than by inaction. Of course, some- 
times there is no choice possible; the status quo cannot be altered. Intuitively, 
the second mover will respond more strongly to generous (or ungenerous) 
choices that overturn the status quo than to those that uphold it or that in- 
volve no real choice by the first mover.3 Compared to no choice, upholding the 
status quo should provoke the stronger response, at least when the status quo 
is the best or worst possible opportunity. 
To formalize the intuition, suppose that the collection of opportunity sets C 
contains at least two elements, and one of them, C*, is the status quo. Let Ac* 
3This intuition goes back at least to Adam Smith's 1759 Theory of Moral Sentiments (Smith 
(1976, p. 181)). 
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and Acc, respectively, denote the second mover's acquired preferences when 
the first mover's chosen opportunity set C is the status quo and when it differs 
from the status quo. On the other hand, when C is a singleton, then the first 
mover has no choice and we write C = {C0} with corresponding second mover 
preferences Aco. 
AXIOM S: Let the first mover choose the actual opportunity set for the second 
mover from the collection C. If the status quo is either F or G and G MGT F, 
then: 
1. AGc MAT AG*, AGo and AF*, AFO MAT AFC, 
2. AG* MAT AGO if G MGT C for all C e C, and AFo MAT AF* if C MGT F 
for all C E C. 
Part 1 of Axiom S says that the effect of Axiom R is stronger when a gener- 
ous (or ungenerous) act upsets the status quo than when the same act merely 
upholds the status quo (or is forced). Part 2 compares the impact of upholding 
the status quo to forced acts. It says that the effect of Axiom R is stronger for 
upholding the status quo, at least when that is the most (or least) generous of 
the options available to the first mover. 
We will say that either axiom holds strictly when the inequalities in the MAT 
and the MGT part (a) definitions are both strict. 
It should be emphasized that the recent preference models noted in Exam- 
ples 2.1-2.4 have no room for Axioms R and S. In those models preferences 
are assumed fixed, unaffected by more or less generous opportunity sets cho- 
sen by the first mover. Actual choices by a first mover are not central even in 
the "reciprocity" models of Charness and Rabin (2002, Appendix), Falk and 
Fischbacher (2006), and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004). Those models 
focus on higher-order beliefs regarding other players' intentions (or, in Levine 
(1998), regarding other players' types). Cox, Friedman, and Gjerstad (2007) 
implicitly considered Axiom R, but only within the particular parametric fam- 
ily of CES utility functions noted in Example 2.4. 
5. CHOICE 
As in neoclassical theory, our maintained assumption is that the player al- 
ways chooses a most preferred point in his opportunity set F. By convexity 
such points must form a connected subset of F. If either preferences A or op- 
portunities F are strictly convex, then that subset is a singleton, that is, there 
is a unique choice (m., y.) e F. In this case all points in F \ {(mA, yA)} are 
revealed to be on lower A-indifference curves than (mA, 
y•). Not all elements of F are candidates for choice in our setup. The first result 
is that, due to strict monotonicity in own payoff m, only points on the eastern 
boundary will be chosen, since they have larger own payoff. 
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PROPOSITION 1: Let (mA, YA) be an A-chosen point in F. Then (mA, YA) e 
dEF. The choice is unique if either the preferences A or the opportunity set F is 
strictly convex. 
All proofs are collected in Appendix A. 
The next result shows that as admissible preferences go from maximally 
malevolent through neutral to maximally benevolent under the MAT ordering, 
the player's choices trace out the entire eastern boundary of the opportunity 
set. The proposition refers to the northern point NF = (m, yF) E dEF and the 
southern point SF, the point in the eastern boundary with smallest y compo- 
nent. 
PROPOSITION 2: Suppose that either preferences A and B or the opportunity 
set F are strictly convex. Let (mA, yA) and (m,, y1) be the points in F chosen 
when preferences are, respectively, A and 13. Then: 
1. B MAT A implies yB > YA. 
2. If (m, y) E dEF and y, > Y > yA, then there are admissible preferences P 
with 13 MAT 7P MAT A such that (m, y) is the P-chosen point in F. 
3. There are admissible preferences for which the chosen point is arbitrarily 
close to SF, and other admissible preferences for which the chosen point is ar- 
bitrarily close to NF. 
Propositions 1 and 2 deal with a fixed opportunity set. Often we need predic- 
tions of how an agent with given preferences will choose in a new opportunity 
set. Neoclassical preference theory offers a prediction that follows from GARP 
(or from convexity and positive monotonicity) in the case of standard budget 
sets. We will sometimes get weaker predictions and sometimes stronger predic- 
tions because we deal with more general opportunity sets and with preferences 
that are convex but not necessarily monotone in other's income y. The follow- 
ing example illustrates this. 
EXAMPLE 5.1: Figure 4 shows standard budget sets F with I = 1, p = 1 
(solid line) and G with I = 2, p = 4 (dashed line). Suppose that a player with 
preferences P picks (mF, YF) from F. What can we predict about his choice 
(mG, YG) from G? If it happens that (mF, yF) is not in G, then neoclassical 
preference theory tells us nothing about (mG, YG). Given the increasing benev- 
olence property IB, we can make a prediction: (mG, YG) lies on the subsegment 
southeast of the point (m, y,) on the G budget line, that is, yG < yF. This is a 
consequence of part 2(a) of the next proposition. 
The result in Example 5.1 can often be strengthened in nonlinear opportu- 
nity sets. The point chosen in one opportunity set can be compared to points 
east of it in another opportunity set using IB, as in part 2(b) of the next proposi- 
tion. As shown in part 3 of the next proposition, using IB together with wy < 0, 
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FIGURE 4.-Illustration of Example 5.1. 
we can obtain even tighter bounds on choice by constructing a point Z which 
solves NTPdF(X) =NTPIG(Z). (The Appendix shows how to extend the defin- 
ition so that Z is well defined even with corners and kinks at which NTP is not 
single valued.) We say that Z = (mz, yz) is southeast of X = (mx, Yx) if and 
only if yz < yx and mz > mx, and Z is northwest of X if both inequalities are 
reversed. 
Figure 5 illustrates the construction of Z and the main implications of the 
next proposition. Part 1 of the proposition is simply standard revealed prefer- 
ence. Part 2 uses IB to compare WTP at points directly east or west of each 
other, while part 3 compares points with the same WTP in different opportu- 
nity sets. 
PROPOSITION 3: Let a player with strictly convex preferences A choose X = 
(mF, YF) from opportunity set F and choose W = (mG, YG) from opportunity 
set G. Then: 
1. IfX E G, then WeG \ F or W = X. 
2. Let Y = (ii, yF) E EG have maximal i and suppose preferences A satisfy 
IB. Then: 
(a) YG < YF if NTPaF(X) < NTPdG(Y) and ii mF. 
(b) yG > YF if NTPaF(X) > NTPdG(Y) and h > mF. 
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FIGURE 5.-Parts 2 and 3 of Proposition 3 predict that, with unchanged IB preferences, the 
choice W on the eastern boundary of G will lie between points Y and Z. Part 1 of the proposition 
predicts that W is north of point P. 
3. Let Z = (mz, Yz) E dEG solve NTPaF(X) = NTPaG(Z), and suppose pref- 
erences A satisfy IB and w < O0. Then: 
(a) YG > Yz if Z is southeast of X. 
(b) YG < Yz if Z is northwest of X. 
Propositions 1-3 do not invoke Axioms R and S. We now shall see that Ax- 
iom R effects can either reinforce or offset the standard revealed preference 
predictions, depending on the first mover's generosity. The next example also 
highlights unique predictions arising from Axiom S. 
EXAMPLE 5.2: Suppose that there is a first mover (FM) who picks one of 
the two standard budget sets for the second mover (SM) in Example 5.1. Since 
G MGT F, Axiom R implies that the SM's choice W E G lies northwest of the 
point (mG, YG) predicted by convexity of preferences and the IB property; since 
(mG, YG) is predicted to be southeast of (m, yF), our model has no testable 
implication in this instance. Recall that neoclassical preference theory also has 
no testable implication when (mF, YF) does not belong to G. If the FM instead 
chooses F, then Axiom R implies that the choice X lies southeast of (mF, YF), 
whereas neoclassical preference theory predicts that X = (mF, YF). Axiom S 
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implies that the choice X* when the status quo is F lies southeast of the choice 
Xo when the FM has no choice, and that the choice Xc when the status quo 
is G lies even further southeast. In contrast, neoclassical preference theory 
assumes preferences are fixed and therefore predicts Xc = X* = Xo. 
6. DIAGNOSTIC TESTS OF AXIOMS R AND S WITH INVESTMENT 
AND DICTATOR GAME DATA 
Building on Example 5.2, one could design an experiment to test the theory 
using two-player sequential move games involving standard budget sets that 
are ordered by MGT. We will, instead, use existing data from experiments with 
the investment and dictator games. (In the dictator game, the experimenter 
gives the SM her opportunity set; the FM has no say in the matter.) These 
games are better suited to testing behavioral implications of Axioms R and S, 
as summarized in the following proposition. 
PROPOSITION 4: Let the FM in the investment game choose F, as the SM's 
opportunity set and let r(s) be the SM's response. Also let the SM be given the 
same opportunity set Fs in a dictator game and let ro (s) be his response there. 
1. If the SM's preferences .A are fixed and satisfy IB, then ro(s) increases in s. 
2. If the SM's preferences satisfy Axiom R and IB, then r(s) increases more 
rapidly in s than does ro(s). 
3. If the SM's preferences also satisfy Axiom S, then r (s) > ro (s) for all feasi- 
ble s. 
Proposition 4 leads to a diagnostic test of Axioms R and S. Our model would 
be falsified by observations if, contrary to parts 1 and 2, the SMs return more in 
either game when they get s than when they get s' > s; or if, contrary to part 3, 
the SMs return more in a dictator game than in an investment game with the 
same opportunity sets F,. 
Using a double-blind protocol, Cox (2004) gathered data from a one-shot in- 
vestment game (Treatment A) with 32 pairs of FMs and SMs. Cox also reported 
parallel data from a dictator game (Treatment C) with another 32 subject pairs 
in which the dictators (SMs) were given exactly the same opportunity sets by 
the experimenter as were given to the SMs by the FMs in the investment game. 
In both treatments, the choices s and r were restricted to integer values but the 
conclusions of Proposition 4 still hold. 
To test the predictions, construct the dummy variable D = 1 for Treatment C. 
Regress the SM choice r on the amount sent s and its interaction with D, 
using a censored regression to account for the limited range of SM choices 
(r E [0, 3s]).4 The estimated coefficient for s is 0.58 (+ standard error of 0.22) 
4The constant is set equal to zero because this is implied by the experimental design restriction 
that SMs cannot return more than they receive from FMs. 
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with one-sided p value of 0.006, consistent with reciprocity and parts 1 and 2 of 
Proposition 4. The estimated coefficient for D x s is -0.69 (?0.32, p = 0.018), 
consistent with Axiom S and part 3 of Proposition 4. Since the coefficient sum 
is statistically indistinguishable from 0, the convexity prediction in part 1 of 
Proposition 4 is neither supported nor contradicted. 
The above estimation uses observations for all amounts sent s. We here con- 
firm the Axiom S tests result by direct hypothesis tests using a subset of the data 
with sufficient observations for paired tests: s = 5 (with 7 observations in each 
treatment) and s = 10 (with 13 observations in each treatment). The Mann- 
Whitney and t test both reject the null hypothesis of no difference between 
the amounts returned in favor of the strict Axiom S alternative hypothesis that 
returns are larger in Treatment A. The one-sided p values for the t test (re- 
spectively the Mann-Whitney test) are 0.027 (0.058) for the s = 5 data and are 
0.04 (0.10) for the s = 10 data.5 
7. TESTS WITH CARROT AND STICK GAME DATA 
Carrot and stick games support within-game direct tests of our model and 
suggest one across-games test. The following proposition draws out the impli- 
cations of these games. 
PROPOSITION 5: Let the FM in the stick, carrot, or carrot-stick game choose 
FI as the SM's opportunity set and let r(s) be the SM's response. 
1. If the SM's preferences A are fixed and satisfy IB, then r(s) increases in s. 
2. If the SM's preferences atisfy Axiom R and IB, then in the stick game r(s) 
increases more rapidly in s than for fixed preferences. 
The model would be falsified by data for any of these games in which SMs 
chose larger returns r(s) for smaller amounts s sent by the FM. The model sug- 
gests that for a given s, smaller (or more negative) returns r should be observed 
in the stick game than in the carrot-stick game. The reasons are two-fold. First, 
comparing the opportunity set Fss for given s in stick to that in carrot-stick 
(FsCS), one sees that Fs MGT Fscs. The MGT ordering across games suggests that reciprocity will boost r in the stick game above its value in the carrot-stick 
game. Second, comparing parts 1 and 2 of the last proposition, one sees that 
reciprocity boosts r in the stick game but not in the other two. 
Andreoni, Harbaugh, and Vesterlund (2003) reported data from carrot, 
stick, and carrot-stick games, each with 30 pairs of FMs and SMs randomly 
matched over 10 periods. They focused on choices in the last 5 periods and so 
shall we.6 The SM's opportunity set has a kink at r = 0 in all three games- 
67%, 57%, and 41% of the SM choices are at the kink, respectively, in the stick 
5Figure 3 in Cox (2004), showing data from Treatments A and C, contains a couple of errors. 
A file with (correct) data from the two treatments is available upon request to the author. 
6Spot checks indicate no substantial changes in results when all 10 periods are included. 
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FIGURE 6.-Fractions of zero returns across games when the first movers send 40 or 120. Only 
data from the last five rounds are included. 
game, carrot game, and carrot-stick game-but the kink has different implica- 
tions across games because FM choices differ across games. Figure 6 shows the 
percentages of constrained (r = 0) responses in the three games for two focal 
FM choices: the minimum allowable amount sent (s = 40) and the equal-split 
amount sent (s = 120). 
We want to compare SM choices r across games holding the FM choice s 
constant and also want to estimate the impact of s on r in each game. The 
kinks and resulting returns of zero lead us to separate the data into two parts, 
corresponding to the data presentation in Figures 5 and 6 in Andreoni, Har- 
baugh, and Vesterlund (2003): a stick regime with choices r < 0 and a carrot 
regime with choices r > 0. The carrot-stick data are included in both regimes 
and are indicated by the dummy variable DCS. We use two-sided tobit estima- 
tors since the lower bound in the stick regime also binds occasionally, as does 
the upper bound in the carrot regime. Random individual subject effects help 
control for heterogeneous preferences across subjects. 
Table I reports the results. Consistent with the predictions from Proposi- 
tion 5, the amount sent s (send) has a significantly positive impact in all games 
and regimes. The estimate 0.36 in the stick regime indicates that, on average, a 
FM who sends 100 more in stick will increase r and thus increase his gross pay- 
This content downloaded from 131.96.28.172 on Fri, 15 Jan 2016 16:33:30 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
48 J. C. COX, D. FRIEDMAN, AND V. SADIRAJ 
TABLE I 
TOBIT PANEL REGRESSIONS WITH RANDOM EFFECTS FOR DEPENDENT VARIABLE r 
Stick Regimea Carrot Regimea 
Constant -31.91 -58.10 
(0.00) (0.00) 
DCS -23.34 -48.25 
(0.03) (0.01) 
Send 0.36 0.41 
(0.00) (0.00) 
DCS x send 0.26 -0.09 
(0.03) (0.23) 
Left, uncensored, rightb (15, 67, 218) (179, 112, 9) 
aData are from the last 5 periods of carrot and/or stick games (Andreoni, Harbaugh, and Vesterlund 
(2003)). One-sided p values are shown in parentheses. 
bThe last row shows the number of left censored observations, uncensored observations, and right 
censored observations. 
off by 5 x 36 = 180, for a net gain of 80. In carrot-stick, the estimated marginal 
impact in this regime is 0.36 + 0.26 = 0.62, significantly larger at the 3% level, 
but the intercept is significantly more negative, at -31.9 - 23.3 = -55.2. The 
estimated return function is rS(s) = -31.9 + 0.36s for stick, which lies every- 
where above its carrot-stick counterpart rcss(s) = -55.2 + 0.62s in the r < 0 
regime. Thus the estimates are consistent with the model's informal across- 
games implication. 
The table reports similar results for the carrot regime. Again as predicted, 
the amount sent s by the FM has a significantly positive marginal impact on 
the amount returned by the SM. The 0.41 coefficient in the carrot game is not 
distinguishable from that in the carrot-stick game in the same regime or from 
its stick counterpart. The model offers no hint about the relative positions of 
the return functions in this regime, but the data show that the carrot function 
rc(s) is significantly higher than the carrot-stick function rCSC(s) in the r > 0 
regime. 
8. TESTS WITH STACKELBERG DUOPOLY DATA 
A limitation of the preceding applications is that data come from games with 
opportunity sets with linear eastern boundaries, so SMs face a constant NTP. 
The standard Stackelberg game in Example 3.4 escapes this straightjacket. Re- 
call that smaller output choices by the Stackelberg Leader create MGT op- 
portunity sets for the Follower. Axiom R says that this will induce MAT pref- 
erences in the Follower. Due to the higher WTP, it seems that the Follower 
should choose points on the eastern boundary with higher NTP, hence larger y, 
by reducing output. 
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It is not quite that simple, however. We must also take into account pref- 
erence convexity and also the changing curvature of the opportunity set. The 
next proposition sorts out these effects and expresses them in terms of the Fol- 
lower's deviation from selfish best reply (the prediction of standard duopoly 
theory). 
PROPOSITION 6: In the Stackelberg ame of Example 3.4 let QD(qL) = qF - q 
be the deviation of the Follower's output choice qF from the selfish best reply qF = 12 - (qL when the Leader chooses output qL. One has 
dQD 1 dw 
=--w- qw, 
dqL 2 dqL 
where w = WTP(MqF, MqL) is willingness to pay at the chosen point. Further- 
more: 
1. If the Follower's preferences A are fixed and linear, then w is constant with 
respect to qL and dQD/dqL is positive if and only ifpreferences at the chosen point 
are malevolent. 
2. If the Follower's preferences A are fixed, and satisfy IB and w < 1, then w is 
decreasing in qL and dQD/dqL contains an additional positive term. 
3. If the Follower's preferences atisfy Axiom R strictly, then w is decreasing in 
qL and dQr /dqL contains an additional positive term. 
4. If Follower's preferences satisfy Axiom S strictly, then w is decreasing in qL 
and d Ql/dqL has an additional positive (negative) term if the status quo is smaller 
(larger) than qL. 
Proposition 6 shows that an increase in qL has three different effects: 
* A reciprocity effect-items 3 and 4 in the proposition. If Axiom R holds 
strictly, then the less generous opportunity set decreases the Follower's WTP, 
increasing qF and qD = QD (qL). Axiom S moderates or intensifies this effect, 
depending on the status quo. 
* A preference convexity (or substitution) effect-item 2 in the proposition. 
The choice point is pushed west, where WTP is less, again increasing qD. 
* An opportunity set shape effect (in some ways analogous to an income 
effect)-item 1 in the proposition. The curvature of the parabola decreases. 
Holding w = WTP constant, qD increases when the Follower is malevo- 
lent (w < 0, hence qD > 0) and decreases when the Follower is benevolent 
(w > 0, hence qD < 0). 
A parametric example may clarify the logic. For given qL e [0, 24], the Fol- 
lower's choice set is the parabola {(m, y): m = MqF, y = MqL, M= 24 - qL - 
qF, qF e [0, 24 - qL]}, with NTP = -(dm/dqF)/(dy/dqF) = (24 - qL - 2qF)/ 
qL. Suppose that the Follower has fixed Cobb-Douglas preferences repre- 
sented by u(m, y) = mye, so WTP is Om/y = OqF/qL. Solving NTP = WTP, 
This content downloaded from 131.96.28.172 on Fri, 15 Jan 2016 16:33:30 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
50 J. C. COX, D. FRIEDMAN, AND V. SADIRAJ 
one obtains qF = Q(qLIO) = (24 - qL)/(2 + 0). Noting that the selfish best 
reply is q- 
= Q(qL10), one obtains a closed form expression for the devia- 
tion: qD = - (24 - qL). For fixed 0 positive (benevolent preferences) or 
smaller than -2 (pathologically malevolent preferences), the deviation is neg- 
ative but increasing in the Leader's output; the opposite is true when 0 is neg- 
ative but larger than -2 (moderately malevolent). This is the combined impact 
of the convexity (or substitution) and shape (or income) effects noted above. 
Of course, reciprocity effects will decrease 0 and hence increase qD. 
We test predictions obtained from Proposition 6 on the Stackelberg duopoly 
data of Huck, Miiller, and Normann (2001, henceforth HMN). The para- 
meters are exactly as in Example 3.4 with integer output choices. The data 
consist of 220 output pairs (qL, qF) by 22 FMs (or Leaders) choosing qL E 
{3, 4, 5, ..., 15} randomly rematched for 10 periods each with 22 SMs (or Fol- 
lowers) who choose qF E {3, 4, 5, ..., 15}. The WTP can be inferred at a chosen 
point (qL, qF) by the NTP at that point, (24 - 2qF - qL)/qL. 
Table II reports the test results. All observations reveal w < 1, as assumed 
in Proposition 6. To check for asymmetric responses to large and small FM 
choices (relative to the Cournot choice qL = 8), we define the dummy variable 
DP = 1 if qL < 8. All columns in the table report panel regressions with individ- 
ual subject fixed effects. The first column, with dependent variable WTP x 100, 
firmly rejects the hypothesis of benevolent linear and fixed preferences: the co- 
efficient for qL is significantly negative, not positive. In view of part 1 of the 
proposition, the second column, with dependent variable QD, confirms this re- 
sult. We infer that QD is an increasing function of FM output qL, consistent 
with convexity and reciprocity, in view of parts 2 and 3 of the proposition. The 
last column reports that there is a stronger response to "greedy" FM choices in 
excess of the Cournot output 8 than to "generous" FM choices below or equal 
to output 8. 
TABLE II 
PANEL REGRESSIONS WITH FIXED EFFECTSa 
Dep. Variable WTP x 100 qD qD 
qL -4.57 0.32 0.23 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.001) 
DP x qL -0.11 
(0.017) 
Constant 21.56 -1.88 -0.70 
(0.012) (0.000) (0.177) 
aData consist of 220 choices by 22 Followers in the HMN experiment. One-sided 
p values are shown in parentheses. 
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9. DIAGNOSTIC TESTS OF RECIPROCITY WITH STACKELBERG MINI-GAME DATA 
The Stackelberg duopoly game data do not permit tests of some of our most 
distinctive predictions. All FMs (Leaders) have the same choice set, eliminat- 
ing variability that could help separate the convexity effect from the reciprocity 
effect. Also, due in part to differing experiences, SMs may have different views 
on the generosity of a given output choice qL. To overcome these limitations 
while preserving the nice parabolic shape of the SM choice sets, we introduce 
a new Stackelberg variant. 
EXAMPLE 9.3-Stackelberg Mini-Game: Take the otherwise standard Stack- 
elberg duopoly game in Example 3.4, but restrict the Leader (FM) to a binary 
output choice, qL e {x, z}, where 0 < x < z < 24. 
The idea here is to manipulate the Leader's choice set so as to obtain a direct 
test of reciprocity. In one situation, a given output choice can be the smaller 
one allowed (hence the most generous to the Follower) and in another situa- 
tion the same choice can be the larger one (hence the least generous). If a given 
Follower reacts differently in the two situations, it must be due to reciprocity 
effects, since by holding the Leader's output constant we have eliminated con- 
vexity and shape effects. The formal statement follows: 
PROPOSITION 7: In the Stackelberg mini-game of Example 9.3, suppose the 
Leader has restricted output choices qL e {x, s} in situation (a) and qL e {s, z} 
in another situation (b), where s is strictly between x and z. Suppose the Leader 
chooses s in both situations and the Follower chooses Q' (s) in situation (a) and 
Q~ (s) in situation (b). If the Follower's preferences atisfy Axioms R and S, then 
Q,(s) > Qb(s) and at each possible Follower choice qF, WTPa(MqF, Ms) 
WTPb (MqF, Ms). 
Thus, contrary to standard revealed preference theory, the model predicts 
that the Follower's choice in a fixed opportunity set F depends in a specific way 
on the alternatives not chosen by the Leader. Our model would be falsified by 
observations if Followers choose larger quantities or reveal higher WTPs when 
Leaders forgo z > s to choose s than when Leaders forgo x < z to choose s. 
In our new Stackelberg mini-game experiment, each subject in the FM role 
twice chooses qL e {6, 9) and twice chooses qL e 19, 12) without feedback. Each 
subject in the SM role is then paired simultaneously with four different FMs 
and chooses an integer value of qF E {5, 6, ..., 11) with no feedback. The cor- 
responding payoffs (m, y) are clearly displayed. Subjects are paid for one of 
the four choices, selected randomly at the end of the session. The "double 
blind" procedures are detailed in the instructions to subjects, reproduced in 
Appendix B. 
To infer how individual subjects respond to reciprocity concerns, we turn 
again to panel regressions with individual subject fixed effects. The second 
This content downloaded from 131.96.28.172 on Fri, 15 Jan 2016 16:33:30 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
52 J. C. COX, D. FRIEDMAN, AND V. SADIRAJ 
TABLE III 
PANEL REGRESSIONS WITH FIXED EFFECTS FOR STACKELBERG 
MINI-GAME DATAa 
w x 100 (qL = 9) qD (qL = 9) qD 
D9 -7.65 0.34 0.32 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.013) 
D12 0.37 
(0.028) 
Constant -5.93 0.27 0.19 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.046) 
Nobs (gr)b 72 (24) 72 (24) 91(24) 
aOne-sided p values are shown in brackets. 
bNobs is the total number of observations (gr is the number of groups). 
column in Table III reports that, consistent with Proposition 7, SMs' average 
WTP decreased by almost 8 cents per dollar when qL = 9 was the less generous 
choice (indicated by D9 = 1). The second column reports the same data in a 
different way: the output deviation increased by 0.34 on average, significant at 
the p = 0.008 level (one sided) when D9 = 1. Since the opportunity set F9 is 
constant in these 72 data points, the result cannot be due to convexity or shape 
effects; it must be pure reciprocity. The last column of Table III reports regres- 
sions for qD for the entire data set, using the additional dummy variable D12, 
which takes value 1 if qL = 12 and 0 otherwise.7 The signs of all coefficient 
estimates are consistent with Axioms R and S and convexity. 
10. DISCUSSION 
Neoclassical theory (e.g., Hicks (1939), Samuelson (1947)) clarified and uni- 
fied earlier work on how opportunities and preferences jointly determine out- 
comes for homo economicus. The present paper applies those now classic ideas 
to social preferences. We focus on need to pay (NTP), the reciprocal of the 
marginal rate of transformation of own income into others' income, and will- 
ingness to pay (WTP), the reciprocal of the marginal rate of substitution be- 
tween own income and others' income. Increasing WTP along indifference 
curves is simply convexity, and convex altruistic preferences provide a unified 
account of several social motives previously considered separately, such as ef- 
ficiency, maximin, and inequality aversion. 
We develop a theory of reciprocal altruism: how choices by one player shift 
preferences of another player and determine outcomes for homo reciprocans. 
7We omit here a dummy variable that takes value 1 for qL = 6 because there are only five such 
observations. When the dummy is included, the coefficient estimate has the predicted sign but of 
course is insignificant statistically, while the other coefficient estimates change only slightly. 
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We say that one opportunity set G is more generous to person X than another 
opportunity set F, and write G MGT F, if the maximum income in G for per- 
son X exceeds his maximum in F and does so by more than the corresponding 
income difference for the other player. We say that one set of preferences is 
more altruistic than (MAT) another if it has a larger WTP at every point. We 
formalize reciprocity as a MAT tilt in preferences following a MGT choice by 
others. The definitions apply to malevolent (WTP < 0) as well as benevolent 
(WTP > 0) preferences, and automatically combine positive and negative reci- 
procity. 
Convexity and reciprocity are quite different formally and conceptually, but 
we show that empirical work has a natural tendency to confound the two no- 
tions. The problem is simply that more generous behavior by a first mover tends 
to push the second mover's opportunities southeast, toward larger income for 
the second mover and smaller income for the first mover. Convexity typically 
implies greater WTP as one pushes southeast, even when there is no MAT shift 
in preferences due to reciprocity. 
Axioms R and S set revealed altruism theory apart from neoclassical pref- 
erence theory. In neoclassical theory, my preferences are an individual char- 
acteristic that is independent of your prior actions that help or harm me. In 
contrast, Axiom R asserts that more generous choices by you induce more al- 
truistic preferences in me. Axiom S further asserts that my induced preferences 
are more altruistic when your generous choice is an act of commission (upset- 
ting the status quo) than when it is an act of omission (upholding the status 
quo), and that this reciprocity effect is even weaker when you are unable to al- 
ter the status quo. The theory incorporates negatively reciprocal altruism: less 
generous choices by you induce less altruistic preferences in me, where "less 
altruistic" can mean "more malevolent." 
Several theoretical propositions develop the observable consequences of 
neoclassical properties such as convexity and the new reciprocity axioms. 
We show that more northerly choices on the eastern boundary of an oppor- 
tunity set reveal more altruistic (or less malevolent) preferences. For fixed 
preferences, choices in one opportunity set reveal bounds on preferences that 
translate into bounds on choices in other opportunity sets. For reciprocal pref- 
erences, a first mover's choice of a more or less generous opportunity set trans- 
lates into bounds on a second mover's choice, and the bounds are contingent 
on the status quo ante. We derive propositions tailored to a set of well-known 
two-player games: investment, dictator, carrot and/or stick, and Stackelberg 
duopoly. The tailored propositions sort out the separate effects of the neoclas- 
sical properties and the new axioms. The paired investment and dictator games 
provide a diagnostic test of the implications of both Axioms R and S. The new 
Stackelberg mini-game provides a diagnostic separation of the implications of 
convexity and reciprocity. 
Finally, to illustrate the empirical content of the theory, we examine three 
existing data sets and one new data set. Existing data from investment and 
This content downloaded from 131.96.28.172 on Fri, 15 Jan 2016 16:33:30 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
54 J. C. COX, D. FRIEDMAN, AND V. SADIRAJ 
dictator experiments reject null hypotheses inconsistent with Axioms R and S 
in favor of alternative hypotheses consistent with the axioms (and convexity). 
Existing data from the stick game and the carrot and stick game support impli- 
cations of Axiom R (and convexity). Existing data from a Stackelberg duopoly 
experiment confirm reciprocity/convexity effects and suggest a stronger nega- 
tive response to greedy behavior than the positive response to generous be- 
havior. Data from a new experiment with the Stackelberg mini-game confirm 
that reciprocity has a significant impact even when convexity effects are held 
constant. The Stackelberg mini-game brings out a novel feature of the new the- 
ory: contrary to standard revealed preference theory, revealed altruism theory 
explains how alternatives not chosen by another can affect one's own choice. 
Theoretical clarification sets the stage for further empirical work. One can 
now refine earlier empirical studies that examine the combined effects of al- 
truism and reciprocity. Such work should shed light not only on the extent to 
which typical human preferences depart from selfishness, but also on the extent 
to which such departures are altered by experiencing generous or ungenerous 
behavior. 
Further theoretical work is also in order. We consider two versions of the 
"more generous than" relation, but yet other versions may have implications 
that are stronger (or just different). For example, generosity might be defined 
in terms of players' utilities rather than in terms of material payoffs (although 
this would compromise observability). Other open theoretical questions con- 
cern Axiom S, which invokes the status quo to distinguish between acts of com- 
mission and omission, and between generous and greedy acts. But what does 
it take for a particular act to become generally recognized as the status quo? 
What if an act has beneficial short run impact but is harmful in the long run? 
Answers to these and other questions await further theoretical development. 
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APPENDIX A: MATHEMATICAL PROOFS AND DERIVATIONS 
A.1. Properties of Preferences 
Recall that preferences over bundles (m, y) e St are admissible if they can 
be represented by a twice continuously differentiable (smooth) utility function 
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u such that du(m, y)/dm = u, > 0, V(m, y) e 2N (m-monotone) and the set 
{(m, y) e Z:u(m, y) > c} is convex for all c e E9 (convex). Recall also that 
willingness to pay is w = w(m, y) = WTP(m, y) = u,/um. 
It will be helpful to express convexity in terms of the curvature of indif- 
ference curves. At a given point, curvature has absolute value IKI = 1/R, 
where R is the radius of the circle that is second-order tangent to the curve 
at the given point. Let 0 denote the angle of the tangent to the indifference 
curve with the negative y direction. The signed curvature is K = dO/ds, where 
s(t) = f m'12(x) + 2(x) dx is arc length along the indifference curve (e.g., 
Protter and Morrey (1963, p. 394)). 
Preferences are positively monotonic in m; hence upper contour sets are on 
the right of indifference curves in (m, y) space. The convexity of upper contour 
sets implies that w decreases as we move up along the indifference curve. The 
first lemma verifies this intuition and obtains other useful characterizations. 
LEMMA .1: The following properties are equivalent for smooth m-monotone 
preferences on 92 
(a) They are convex. 
(b) Their indifference curves everywhere have negative (or zero) curvature. 
(c) ww - Wy> >0. 
PROOF: Note that along the indifference curve 0 = arctan(dm/dy) 
arctan(-w). Into the definition K = dO/ds, insert dO = -d(w)/(1 + w2), 
ds = vdm2 + dy2, and (holding u constant) -dm/dy = w to get 
1 dw 
(A.1) K = 
/w2 + 13 dy 
Since the expression inside the radical is positive, the sign of K is that of 
dw/dy. The upper contour set at a point (mo, yo) with u(mo, yo) = c lies on 
the right or on the tangent hyperplane if and only if (dw/dy) Iu(m,y)=c O0, as can 
be seen, for example, from a straightforward adaptation of Protter and Morrey 
(1963). Hence conditions (a) and (b) are equivalent. To verify the equivalence 
of (b) and (c), simply substitute dw/dy = Wm dm/dy + wy and dm/dy = -w 
into (A.1) to obtain 
WWm - Wy (A.2) K=- w   
/w2+1-3 
" Q.E.D. 
LEMMA A.2: (d(NTP)/dy) I(m,y)EdF > 0 at every regular boundary point of an 
opportunity set. 
This content downloaded from 131.96.28.172 on Fri, 15 Jan 2016 16:33:30 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
56 J. C. COX, D. FRIEDMAN, AND V. SADIRAJ 
PROOF: The reasoning is the same as in the previous lemma. Along the 
boundary 
1 d(NTP) (A.3) K= 3 
VNTP2 
31 dy 
Thus K = dOlds has the same sign as d(NTP)/dy. Our feasible opportunity set 
F lies on the left or on the tangent hyperplane at a point from the boundary dF. 
Hence, as y increases the boundary is turning left, so 0 increases and (by (A.3)) 
NTP increases. Q.E.D. 
The next lemma characterizes homotheticity to facilitate comparisons to the 
weaker properties used in the propositions. 
LEMMA .3: The following are equivalent: 
(a) Preferences are homothetic on 912 
(b) w = WTP is constant along every ray Rr = {(t, tr) : t > 01 C 9. (c) Wm + Wyr = 0 along every ray Rr, r > 0. 
PROOF: By definition, preferences are homothetic if and only if they can 
be represented by a utility function u(m, y) whose ratio of partial deriva- 
tives um/u, depends only on the ratio m/y (e.g., Simon and Blume (1994, 
p. 503)). Thus condition (a) implies that w = u,/Um is constant along the ray 
with r = m/y and so condition (b) must hold. In turn, condition (b) implies 
that along that ray 0 = dw/dt = Wm dm/dt + wy dy/dt = Wm + Wyr, establish- 
ing condition (c). ing condition (c). Since rays with r> 0 foliate 92N \ (0, 0), condition (c) implies that w and hence um/uy depend only on r = m/y, that is, (a) must hold. Q.E.D. 
DEFINITION 3: Preferences are rather malevolent (resp. not very malevo- 
lent) on a domain D if w < wy/Wm (resp. w > wy/Wm) holds at all points in 
Dc 2 . 
LEMMA A.4: (a) If admissible preferences are homothetic on 92, then they 
are IB. 
(b) Convexity on 92 is equivalent to IB for preferences that are not very malev- 
olent, and is equivalent to wm < 0 forpreferences that are rather malevolent. 
PROOF: For part (a) we need to show that wm(m, y) is nonnegative. It suf- 
fices to show that the sign of w(m + 8, y) - w(m, y) is the same as the sign of 
8, for all 8. If 8 > 0, then (m + 8, y) is on a ray (Ry/(m+6)) with a smaller slope 
than the ray through (m, y). This, convexity, and homotheticity imply that 
w(m + 8, y) 
_ 
w(m, y). Similarly, w(m + 8, y) < w(m, y) for negative 8. For 
part (b), recallfrom Lemma A.1 that convexity is equivalent to wmW - wy 0. 
But this is equivalent to wm > 0 (wm 
_ 
0) if w > Wy/wm (w 
_ 
Wy/Wm). Q.E.D. 
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To see the bite of the assumptions, consider preferences represented by 
u(m, y) = m'/r - y(l+r)/(1 +r). For r > 1, these preferences are IB, but neither 
convex nor homothetic. For r E (0, 1), however, they are convex, but neither IB 
nor homothetic. 
A.2. Proof that MAT Is a Partial Ordering 
The properties of reflexivity and transitivity are inherited from the reflexivity 
and transitivity of the real ordering >. The antisymmetry property follows from 
Hicks' lemma (Hicks (1939, Appendix)): if preferences have the same MRS (or 
WTP) everywhere in a domain D, then they are the same on that domain. 
A.3. Proof that MGT Is a Partial Ordering 
Reflexivity, antisymmetry, and transitivity all are inherited from the corre- 
sponding properties of the real ordering >. 
A.4. Proof that Stackelberg Follower's Opportunity Sets Are MGT-Ranked 
The Follower's opportunity set FqL has eastern boundary {(m, y):m = 
MqF, y = MqL, qF E [0, T - qL]}, where M = T - qL - qF. Along this boundary 
NTP is given by 
dm/dqF T - qL - 2qF 
dy/dqF qL 
Note that NTP varies smoothly from positive to negative values as increasing 
qF passes through q0 = T/2 - qL/2, the selfish best response. To see that a 
smaller output by the Leader produces a MGT opportunity set for the Fol- 
lower, first note that Y(qL) = (T - qL)qL is obtained when qF = 0 and that 
m)* = -(T - qL)2 is obtained from the standard (selfish) reaction func- 
tion qO. To verify condition (a) in the MGT definition, let q' E (qL, T - qL) 
and note that m() (q = -(2T- qL 
- q-)(q' - qL) > 0. Condition (b) 
follows from YF(q,) - Y;(q') = (qL + q' - T)(q' - qL) < O. 
A.5. Examples of MGT-Ordered Opportunity Sets 
EXAMPLE A.5.1--Ring Test (Liebrand (1984); see also Sonnemans, van Dijk, 
and van Winden (2006)): Let F(R) = {(m, y) E2: nm2 + y2 < R2} for given 
R > 0. On the circular part of the boundary, NTP is y/m and the curvature is 
1/R. Straightforwardly, F(R) MGT F(R') if R > R'. 
EXAMPLE A.5.2-Ultimatum Game (Giuth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze 
(1982)): The responder's opportunities in the $10 ultimatum game consist of 
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the origin (0, 0) and (due to our free disposal assumption) the horizontal line 
segment from (0, 10 - x) to (x, 10 - x). This set is not convex so it does not 
qualify as an opportunity set by our definition. Its convex hull, however, is the 
opportunity set in the convex ultimatum game (Andreoni, Castillo, and Petrie 
(2003)), which is identical to that of the power to take game in the following 
example. 
EXAMPLE A.5.3-Power to Take Game (Bosman and van Winden (2002)): 
The "take authority" player chooses a take rate b E [0, 1]. Then the responder 
with income I chooses a destruction rate 1 - 8. The resulting payoffs are m = 
(1 - b)5I for the responder and y = b5I for the take authority. Thus, with 
free disposal the responder's opportunity set is the convex hull of three points 
(m, y) = (0, 0), (0, bI), and ((1 - b)I, bI). Along the eastern boundary NTP is 
constant at (b - 1)/b and the curvature is 0. To verify the strict MGT ranking, 
let b' > b > 0 produce SM opportunity sets F and G, respectively, so m* = 
(1 - b')I and yF = b'l. Then m* - m* = (b' - b)I > 0 > (b - b')I = y? - yF. 
The first inequality confirms part (a) of the definition and the entire string 
confirms part (b). 
EXAMPLE A.5.4--Ultimatum Mini-Games (Gale, Binmore, and Samuelson 
(1995), Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher (2003)): In the notation of the previous 
example, the FM in these games chooses between b = 0.8 and one other value, 
either b = 0.5 in the 5/5 game, or b = 0.2 in the 2/8 game, or b = 0.8 in the 8/2 
game, or b = 1.0 in the 10/0 game. The previous example shows that the (con- 
vexified) opportunity sets are MGT-ranked by decreasing b. Axiom R suggests 
that the SM is more likely to choose (0, 0) (reject the ultimatum) rather than 
((1 - b)I, bI) (accept) when the FM's choice of b was less generous. Hence re- 
jections of the b = 0.8 proposal should be more frequent when the alternative 
was b = 0.5 or b = 0.2 rather than b = 1.0. Axiom S suggests that the responses 
would be muted when the alternative was b = 0.8 (i.e., no choice). The data are 
consistent with these predictions; see Cox, Friedman, and Gjerstad (2007) for 
a detailed structural analysis. 
EXAMPLE A.5.5-Moonlighting Game (Abbink, Irlenbusch, and Renner 
(2000)): In this variant of the investment game, the FM sends s e [-1/2, 1] 
to the SM, who receives g(s) = ks for positive s and g(s) = s for negative 
s. Then the second mover transfers t E [(-I + s)/k, I + g(s)], resulting in 
nonnegative payoffs m = I + g(s) - Itl, and y = I - s + t for positive t and 
y = I - s + kt for negative t. The second mover's opportunity set is the convex 
hull of the points (m, y) = (0, 0), (I + g(s) - (I - s)/ k, 0), (I + g(s), I - s), 
and (0, 21 + g(s) - Isl). The NTP along the boundary of the opportunity set 
is 1 above and -1/k below the t = 0 locus, is 0 along the y axis, and is oc 
along the m axis. Again, curvature at all regular boundary points is K = 0. It is 
straightforward to verify that larger s produces higher MGT ranking. 
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EXAMPLE A.5.6-Gift Exchange Labor Markets (Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and 
Riedl (1993)): The employer with initial endowment I offers a wage We 
[0, I] and the worker then chooses an effort level e E [0, 1] with a quadratic 
cost function c(e). The final payoffs are m = W - c(e) for the worker and 
y = I + ke - W for the employer, where the productivity parameter k = 10 in 
a typical game. The worker's opportunity set is similar to the second mover's 
in the investment game, except that the northeastern boundary is a parabolic 
arc instead of a straight line of slope -1. Along this eastern boundary NTP is 
2e and the curvature is 
-1/5(4e2 + 1)3/2. Also, if the employer offers a wage in 
excess of his endowment I, then the opportunity set includes part of the quad- 
rant [m > 0 > y]. It is straightforward but a bit messy to extend the definition 
of opportunity set to include such possibilities. Again, one can directly verify 
that larger W produces higher MGT ranking. 
EXAMPLE A.5.7-Sequential VCM Public Good Game with Two Players 
(Varian (1994)): Each player has initial endowment I. The FM contributes 
cl e [0, I] to the public good. The SM observes cl and then chooses his contri- 
bution c2 e [0, I]. Each unit contributed has a return of a e (0.5, 1], so the final 
payoffs are m = I + acl - (1 - a)c2 for the SM and y = I + ac2 - (1 - a)cl for 
the FM. The SM's opportunity set is the convex hull of the four points (m, y) = 
(0, I - (1 - a)cl), (I + ac, I - (1 - a)cl), (aI + 
acl, (1 + a)I - (1 - a)cl), and (0, (1 + a)I - (1 - a)cl). Along the Pareto frontier, NTP is constant at 
(1 - a)/a. Once again, a larger contribution cl creates MGT opportunities for 
the second mover. 
A.6. Proof of Proposition 1 
Suppose that (mA, YA) EF. Then by definition of dEF there exists z > MA 
such that M = (z, YA) E F. Positive monotonicity in own payoff implies that M 
is strictly preferred to (mAA, YA), contradicting the hypothesis that (mAA, YA) is 
the A-preferred point in F. 
A.7. Proof of Proposition 2 (Theoretical Predictions for Fixed Opportunity Sets) 
By Lemma A.2, NTP increases as y increases along dEF. 
Part 1: Convexity of F and optimality of (mB, yB) imply that dEF (includ- 
ing the part north of (m,, ye)) lies in the negative closed half-space for the 
tangent line HB to the B-indifference curve through (mr, y ). B MAT A im- 
plies that the tangent line HA of the A-indifference curve through the same 
point (mB, y,) is a clockwise rotation of HB. Hence, the dEF-points north of 
(mB, y,) are from the negative half-space of HA and, from convexity of prefer- 
ences A, their A-indifference curves are at lower levels than (mnB, ye). There- 
fore (mnA, 
y•) must be south of (mB, ye). 
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Part 2: By hypothesis, X = (m, y) is south of (mrB, y1) and north of (mA, YA). Let Wa and wb denote WTP functions for A and B preferences; 
by admissibility the functions are continuous. The desired conclusion is triv- 
ial if wb(m, y) = Wa(m, y) and Lemma A.2 rules out wb(m, y) < Wa(m, y), 
so suppose wb(m, y) > Wa(m, y). To construct the desired preferences 7, let 
wp(Y) = kwb(Y) + (1 - k)wa(Y), where 
NTP(m, y) - Wa(m, y) 
Wb(m, y) - Wa(m, y) 
Since wp is continuous on 9t2, classic theorems assure the existence of a utility 
function whose WTP is 
we(Y) (Hurwicz (1958, pp. 7-10); see also Hurwicz and Uzawa (1971)). Let P denote the preferences represented by this utility func- 
tion. Since the hypothesis implies that 0 < k < 1, we have B MAT P MAT A. 
By construction, (m, y) is P-chosen since wp(m, y) = NTP(m, y). 
Part 3: Linear preferences with w approaching -oo (+oo) yield choices ar- 
bitrarily close to SF (NF). 
A.8. Proof of Proposition 3 (Theoretical Predictions for Different 
Opportunity Sets) 
Suppose that X is a regular point from dEF. Then x = NTP(X) is unique. 
Let the NTP of points from dEG take values between [y,, y*]. Z is NF if 
NTP(X) > y* and SF if NTP(X) < y,; otherwise Z is the point of 9EG with 
x = NTP(Z). Such a point exists by the intermediate value theorem and is 
unique because G is convex. If X is not a regular point, then NTP(X) takes 
values from some [6,, 8*]. Make the arbitrary convention that x = 8* and pro- 
ceed as with a regular point. 
Part 1: Follows from standard revealed preference theory (e.g., Varian 
(1992, pp. 131-133)). 
Part 2: Clearly 'i < mF and WTPm > 0 imply WTP(Y) < WTP(X), while NTPaF(X) < NTPdG(Y), optimality of X (so WTP(X) = NTPdF(X)), and 
transitivity together imply that WTP(Y) < NTPOG(Y). By convexity of A, all 
points from dG north of Y are on lower A-indifference curves than Y so they 
cannot be W. Thus W must be south of Y and 2(a) follows. One obtains 2(b) 
in just the same way. 
Part 3: Suppose Z is southeast of X. Then 
WTP(Z) > WTP(X) = NTPdF(X) = NTPdG(Z), 
where the first inequality follows by assumption, whereas the equalities follow 
from optimality of X and by construction of Z. By convexity of A, all points 
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from dG south of Z are on lower A-indifference curves than Z so they cannot 
be W. That is, W must be north of Z. Likewise for the case with Z northwest 
of X. 
A.9. Proof of Proposition 4 (Investment Game) 
Part 1: Let r(s) be the optimal choice of the SM when the FM choice is s 
and let XF, = (10 + 3s - r(s), 10 - s + r(s)). Let s' > s. Proposition 3(b) tells 
us that yF,, > YFs. This implies that r(s') > s' - s + r(s) > r(s). 
Part 2: Applying Axiom R in the argument above, we see that r(s') increases 
more rapidly in s than for fixed preferences. 
Part 3: Axiom S has the indicated impact since, as shown in the previous 
subsection, F, is MGT ordered by s. 
A.10. Proof of Proposition 5 (Carrot, Stick, and Carrot-Stick Games) 
Let r(s) be the optimal choice of the SM when the FM choice is s and let 
XFs 
= (S - Ir(s)I, 240 - s + 5r(s)). Let s' > s. The amount returned r(s) is non- 
positive in the stick game, nonnegative in the carrot game, and can be either in 
the carrot-stick game. 
Part 1: Proposition 3(b) tells us that yFs, > yFs. This implies that r(s') > (s' - 
s)/5 + r(s) > r(s). 
Part 2: Applying Axiom R in the argument above, we see that r(s) increases 
more rapidly in s than for fixed preferences in the stick game. 
A.11. Proof of Proposition 6 (Stackelberg Duopoly Game) 
The FOC can be written as w(qF, qL) =WTP(MqF, MqL) = NTP = (24 - 
2qF)/qL - 1, which can be rewritten as 
(A.4) qF = 12 - qFqL) + 1 2 
Inserting the definition of QD from the statement of the proposition, we obtain 
w(qF, qL ) (A.5) QD =-  qL 2 
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Part 1-Linear Preferences: If Follower's preferences are fixed and linear 
with WTP = w, then differentiation of (A.5) with respect to qL gives 
dQD w 
dqL 2 
Part 2-Convex Preferences: If Follower's preferences are fixed and convex, 
then 
dQD W(qF, qL) qL dW(qF, qL) 
dqL 2 2 dqL 
The additional (second) term above is positive because, as we now will verify, 
dw(qF, qL)/dqL is negative. Indeed, 
dw(qF, qL) 
dqL 
dm dy 
= Wm + Wy dqL dqL 
= 
Wm -1 
- qF +M +Wy -1- qL + M , 
which after substituting M = 24 - qL - qF, qF = 12 - (w(qF, qL) + 1)qL/2, 
and dqF/dqL = -(w(qF, qL) + 1)/2 - (dw(qF, qL)/dqL)qL/2, and solving for 
dw(qF, qL)/dqL yields 
dw(qF, qL) B 
dqL A' 
where 
A = 2 + [WmW- Wy]q2 > 0 
by Lemma A.1 and 
B = 24(w, - Wm) + qL(1 - W)(Wm - Wy + WWm - wy) 
= (Wy - Wm)(24 - qL(1 - w)) + qL(1 - W)(WWm - wy). 
Note that qF 24 - qL and (A.4) imply that the sign of the second factor in the 
first term is positive; hence B is negative if and only if 
Wy-wm 1-w 
wwm 
- wy - 24/qL - (1 -W) 
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The current assumptions of w < 1, convexity, and IB (i.e., w, 
>_ 
0) ensure that 
the right-hand side of the last expression is nonnegative whereas the left-hand 
side is negative, so the inequality holds. 
Part 3--Axiom R Effect: Let wr(qF, qL) denote WTP for changed prefer- 
ences as per Axiom R. Then 
wr(qF, qL) 
QD 2 qL 
for all qL and 
d Qr wr(q,, qL) qL dw'(qF, qL) 
dqL 2 2 dqL 
w(qF, qL) wr(qF, qL) - W(qF, qL) qL dwr(qF, qL) 
2 2 2 dqL 
From Axiom R, the second term is positive. The derivation of the sign of the 
third term is similar to part 2 above. 
Part 4--Axiom S Effect: Let wS(qF, qL) denote WTP for changed prefer- 
ences as in Axiom S. Then 
Ws (qF, qL) 
D 2 2 qL 
is smaller (larger) than Qr if the status quo is smaller (larger) than qL, and 
dQ ws 
(qr, qL) qL 
dws (qF, qL) 
dqL 2 2 dqL 
has an additional positive (negative) term if the status quo is smaller (larger) 
than qL. 
A.12. Proof of Proposition 7 (Stackelberg Mini-Game) 
In situation (a), induced preferences 
AaF 
are 
AFa 
or 
AF, 
depending on 
whether output x is considered as status quo by the Follower. Axiom S im- 
plies A a MAT A a and A a MAT 
.Aa. 
Similarly, in situation (b), Axiom S 
implies A MAT Ax F and 
AF 
MAT AF. By transitivity Abs MAT A. Then 
the last inequality is straightforward by definition of MAT, whereas for the first 
one recall that (i) q) stays constant (it depends only on s) and (ii) NTP along 
8F, decreases as 
qv 
increases. 
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APPENDIX B: INSTRUCTIONS 
Welcome 
This is an experiment about decision-making. You will be paid a $5 participa- 
tion fee plus an additional positive or zero amount of money determined by 
the decisions that you and the other participants make, as explained below. 
Payment is in cash at the end of the experiment. A research foundation has 
provided the funds for this experiment. 
No Talking Allowed 
Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk. If you have 
a question, please raise your hand and an experimenter will approach you and 
answer your question in private. 
A Monitor and Two Groups 
A monitor will be selected randomly from among those of you who came here 
today. The rest of you have been divided randomly into two groups, called the 
First Mover Group and the Second Mover Group. 
Complete Privacy 
The experiment is structured so that no one-not even the experimenters, 
the monitor, and the other subjects-will ever know your personal decision 
in the experiment. You collect your cash payment from a staff person in the 
Economics Department office who has no other role in the experiment. Your 
payment is in a sealed envelope with a code letter (A, B, C, etc.). Your privacy 
is guaranteed because neither your name nor your student ID number will ap- 
pear on any decision records. The only identifying mark on the decision forms 
will be a code letter known only to you. You will show your code letter to the 
staff person and nobody else will see it. The experimenters will not be in the 
department office when you collect you cash payment. This procedure is used 
to protect your privacy. 
The Idea of the Game 
The game involves two players, called the First Mover (FM) and the Second 
Mover (SM), in the roles of producers of an identical good. Each decides how 
much to produce. The profit for each player is the number of units he decides 
to produce times price, net of cost. The price of the good decreases as total 
production increases. If you and the other player produce too much, you will 
drive down the price and your profits. Of course, if you don't produce much 
you won't have many units to sell. 
To simplify your task, the profits will be calculated for you and shown in an 
easy-to-read table. Your cash payment will include the profit you earn in one 
round of the game. The round will be selected randomly at the end of the ex- 
periment. 
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Game Details 
Each round the FM chooses between two possible amounts to produce, as 
shown in a table with two rows. The SM sees the choice of the FM, and then 
decides among seven possible amounts to produce, as shown in seven columns 
of the same table. The table shows the profits for both players. The FM's profit 
is shown in italics in the lower left corner of each box, and the SM's profit is 
shown in bold in the upper right corner. For example, in Table B.1 below, if 
FM chooses Output = 6 and SM then chooses Output = 4, then FM's profit is 
84 and SM's profit is 56. 
TABLE B.1 
SM's Choice of Output Quantity 
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
FM's output = 6 84 56 78 65 72 77 80 81 80 77 
FM's output = 9 9944 90 50 81 54 56 56 54 450 3644 99 90 81 72 63 54 45 36 
Different Subject Pairs in Every Decision 
Each First Mover and each Second Mover will make four decisions. But the 
pairing of First Movers with Second Movers will be different in every decision. 
This means that you will interact with a DIFFERENT person in the other 
group in every decision that you make. 
Experiment Procedures and the Monitor 
At the beginning of the experiment, the monitor will walk through the room 
carrying a box containing unmarked, large manila envelopes. Each subject in 
the First Mover Group will take one of these envelopes from the box. This 
envelope will contain the experiment decision forms and a code letter. 
After the First Movers have made their decisions, they return the experiment 
decision forms to their large manila envelopes and then walk to the front of the 
room and deposit the envelopes in the box on the table. It is very important 
that the First Movers do NOT return their code letters to the large manila 
envelopes, because they will need them to collect their payoffs. 
After all First Movers have deposited their envelopes in the box, the Monitor 
will take the box to another room in which the experimenters will sort the 
decision forms and place them in the correct large manila envelopes for the 
Second Movers. The experimenters will also put code letters in the envelopes 
for the Second Movers. 
Next, the Monitor will walk through the room carrying a box containing un- 
marked, large manila envelopes. Each subject in the Second Mover Group will 
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take one of these envelopes from the box. This envelope will contain the ex- 
periment decision forms and a code letter. 
After the Second Movers have made their decisions, they return the experi- 
ment decision forms to their large manila envelopes and then walk to the front 
of the room and deposit the envelopes in the box on the table. It is very im- 
portant that the Second Movers do NOT return their code letters in the large 
manila envelopes because they will need them to collect their payoffs. 
After all Second Movers have deposited their envelopes in the box, the Mon- 
itor will take the box to another room in which the experimenters will record 
the profits and cash payments determined by the subjects' decisions. 
A Roll of a Die Determines Which Decision Pays Money 
Although you will make four decisions, only one will pay cash. Which of these 
decisions will pay cash will be determined by rolling a six-sided die. The exper- 
imenter will roll the die in front of you and the monitor will announce which 
of the numbered sides has ended up on top. The first number from 1 to 4 that 
ends up on top will determine the page number of the decision that pays cash. 
The monitor's cash payment will be the average of all First Movers' and Sec- 
ond Movers' payments. 
Be Careful 
Be careful in recording your decisions. If a First Mover forgets to circle one of 
the rows in the table or circles both rows on the same decision page, then it will 
be impossible to ascertain what decision the First Mover made. In that case, 
the First Mover will get paid 0 and the Second Mover will get paid 60 if that 
decision page is selected for payoff by the roll of the die. If a Second Mover 
doesn't circle a column, then it will be impossible to ascertain what decision 
the Second Mover made. In that case, the Second Mover will get paid 0 and 
the First Mover will get paid 60 if that decision page is selected for payoff by 
the roll of the die. 
Pay Rates 
For each point of profit you earn, the experimenter will put a fixed number of 
dollars in your envelope. This fixed number is called the pay rate and is written 
on the board at the front of the room. Today's pay rate is $0.25, which means 
that every participant earns 25 cents for each profit point shown in the table. 
Frequently Asked Questions 
Q01: Exactly how are profits calculated in the tables? 
A: Price is 30 minus the sum of FM output and SM output. Marginal cost is 6. 
Profit is output times (price minus marginal cost). But you don't have to worry 
about doing the calculation; the tables do it for you. 
Q2: Who will know what decisions I make? 
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A: Nobody else besides you; that is the point of the private envelopes etc. The 
experimenters are only interested in knowing the distribution of choices for 
FMs and SMs, not in the private decisions of individual participants. 
Q3: Is this some psychology experiment with an agenda you haven't told us? 
A: No. It is an economics experiment. If we do anything deceptive or don't pay 
you cash as described, then you can complain to the campus Human Subjects 
Committee and we will be in serious trouble. These instructions are on the 
level and our interest is in seeing the distribution of choices made in complete 
privacy. 
Any More Questions? 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and an experimenter will 
approach you and answer your question in private. Make sure that you under- 
stand the instructions before beginning the experiment; otherwise you could, 
by mistake, mark a different decision than you intended. 
Quiz 
1. In Table B.2 below, what are the two possible output choices for the FM? 
TABLE B.2 
SM's Choice of Output Quantity 
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
FM's output = 9 9944 90 50 8154 7256 63 56 54 54 45 50 44 
FM's output = 12 96 32 84 35 7236 60 35 48 32 36 27 24 20 12 11 FM' oupu  72 60 48 36 24  
2. Does the SM see the FM's choice? (Y or N) 
3. In Table B.2, can the SM choose: 
(a) Output = 5? _ _(Y or N) 
(b) Output = 7?_ _(Y or N) 
(c) Output = 12?_ _(Y or N) 
4. Suppose the FM chooses the top row (Output = 9) in Table B.2 and the 
SM chooses a middle column (Output = 8). 
(a) How many points will the FM get? points 
(b) How much money is that if this is the decision that pays money? 
$ 
(c) How much will the SM get in this case? points, $ 
5. In the previous question, if the SM chose Output = 9 instead of 
Output = 8, 
(a) how many more or fewer points would the SM get? 
more/fewer points 
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(b) how many more or fewer points would the FM get? 
more/fewer points 
6. If the FM chooses the top row, what is the maximum number of points 
that the SM can get? the minimum number? 
7. If the FM chooses the bottom row, what is the maximum number of 
points that the SM can get? __ the minimum number? 
8. Will the SM ever be able to tell which person made any FM choice? 
(Y or N) 
9. Will the FM ever be able to tell which person made any SM choice? (Y or N) 
10. Will the experimenter ever be able to tell who made any choices? (Y or N) 
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